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ALLIANCES AND THE INNOVATION PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE 
AND PUBLIC RESEARCH SPIN-OFF FIRMS 
 
 
Abstract  
We explore the innovation performance benefits of alliances for spin-off firms, in particular 
spin-offs from either other firms or from public research organizations. During the early years 
of the emerging combinatorial chemistry industry, the industry on which our empirical 
analysis focuses, spin-offs engaged in alliances with large and established partners, partners 
of similar type and size, and with public research organizations, often for different reasons. 
We seek to understand to what extent alliances of spin-offs with other firms (either large or 
small and medium sized firms) affected their innovation performance and also how this 
performance may have been affected by their corporate or public research background. We 
find evidence that in general alliances of spin-offs with other firms, in particular alliances 
with large firms, increased their innovation performance. Corporate spin-offs that formed 
alliances with other firms outperformed public research spin-offs with such alliances. This 
suggests that, in terms of their innovation performance, corporate spin-offs that engaged in 
alliances with other firms seemed to have benefitted from their prior corporate background. 
Interestingly, it turns out that the negative impact of alliances on the innovation performance 
of public research spin-offs was largely affected by their alliances with small and medium 
sized firms.  
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Over the last two decades, globalization and increased competition has reshaped the 
innovation strategies of many firms towards a greater focus on external sources of knowledge 
(e.g. Archibugi and Michie 1995; OECD 2007). Internal sources of technological 
development alone are often insufficient to cope with the increasing intensity of competition 
as well as with the complexity and uncertainty of modern technologies. The alliance literature 
has well established that firms in technology-intensive industries are increasingly involved in 
various collaborations with heterogeneous partners, recognizing the crucial role of inter-firm 
networks and alliance portfolios in determining firms’ innovation performance (e.g., George 
et al. 2001; Powell and Grodal 2005). Despite the wide recognition of alliances as a major 
vehicle for knowledge transfer and access to other firms’ knowledge-based resources and 
capabilities (see also Mowery et al. 1996; Hagedoorn 1993), surprisingly, prior research gave 
limited attention to whether and how participation in inter-firm networks and formation of 
alliances affect the innovation performance of spin-offs, as a specific group of firms.  
Notwithstanding this apparent omission, spin-off firms are worthwhile to study for 
several reasons. First, these firms are quite distinct from other (traditional) technological 
start-up firms in that they often have preferential access to valuable and difficult to imitate 
resources (Dahl and Sorenson 2014) and are more closely connected to their environment 
compared to other more loosely linked startups (Sedaitis 1998). Second, a substantial increase 
in the number of new firms as a result of spin-offs from existing firms and public research 
organizations, in particular in such sectors as biotechnology and information technology 
(Spin-Off Advisors, 2014), lead to a substantial academic and policy interest in these firms. 
Consequently, an important stream of literature has emerged since the early work by Cooper 
(1971) and Garvin (1983) that documents important positive contributions of spin-offs to 
economic value and growth. 
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In this paper we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature on spin-offs by 
examining two related questions, i.e. ‘why’ and ‘with whom’ (with which categories of firms) 
participation in inter-firm alliance networks benefits the innovation performance of spin-off 
firms. In answering these two questions, we take a portfolio approach – a collection of all 
alliance links maintained by a focal firm – that serves as a vehicle for accessing and 
recombining knowledge to increase (innovation) performance (Wassmer, 2010). The 
potential benefits (the why question) of engaging in alliances derive from the notion that spin-
offs in the combinatorial chemistry and biopharmaceutical industries operate in an 
environment characterized by strong technology and market uncertainties (Malo 2009; 
Santoro and McGill 2005). In addition, few, if any, spin-offs initially possess the 
comprehensive range of technological capabilities needed to stay innovative across a broad 
set of products and services (Forrest 1990).  Consequently, forming alliances with other firms 
holds a promise for knowledge cross-fertilization, cumulative learning and facilitates spin-off 
firms to become more efficient in their technology-development activities (Clarysse, 
Heirman, Degroof 2000; Lechner, Dowling and Welpe 2006; Lockett, Siegel, Wright and 
Ensley 2005). 
Given the specific nature of these firms, as young and technology-intensive but often 
lacking business acumen, we subsequently examine ‘with whom’ (i.e. large incumbent or 
similar-sized partners) the realization of the upside potential of alliances is most viable. We 
expect that the answer to this question partly depends on the formative nature of a spin-off 
itself. In addition to alternative alliance partner settings, we, therefore, also consider two 
major categories of spin-offs with very different backgrounds: corporate spin-offs (CSOs), 
firms that were spun-off (divested) by other firms, and public research spin-offs (PROs), 
firms that were spun-off (divested) by universities or public research organizations (Shane 
2004; Helm and Mauroner 2007;  Klepper 2009 for an overview). Prior research reveals 
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significant differences between these two types of spin-off firms in such aspects as superior 
employment and sales growth of CSOs compared to PROs (e.g., Stankiewicz 1994; Callan 
2001; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Yagüe-Perales and March-Chordà 2012; Zhang 2009). On 
the other hand, not much is known about the similarities or differences in the networking 
strategies of CSOs and PROs and how the underlying alliance choices made by these young, 
technology-intensive firms can help explain subsequent innovation performance differences 
between PROs and CSOs (cf., Lindholm-Dahlstrand 1997; Löfsten and Lindelöf 2005).  
In addressing our research questions we draw on a knowledge conversion capability 
perspective (Boeker 1989; Zahra, Van Develde, Larrenta 2007) and integrate insights from 
two equally influent and informative schools of thought in the alliance literature that point at 
either the positive or the negative effects of asymmetric alliances involving young, relatively 
unestablished entrants and resource-abundant, large incumbent firms.  
We test hypotheses in a unique, historical, empirical setting – a panel of 135 publicly 
traded spin-offs in the nascent field of combinatorial chemistry (i.e. an automated synthesis 
method capable of creating dozens, if not hundreds and thousands, of different molecules 
simultaneously for the purpose of discovering drugs, new materials, pesticides, etc.) during 
the years 1990 – 2003. As such, our research covers the crucial period of the emergence and 
gradual maturing of that industry (Thomke and Kuemmerle 2002), a period also characterized 
by high growth and increasing alliance activity of relevant spin-offs.  
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship spin-off literature by highlighting why 
and when alliances matter for innovation performance of two very different categories of 
spin-offs, CSOs and PROs. This is a novel perspective, as prior studies have given only 
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limited attention to the network strategies of spin-offs
1
 and up till now primarily focused on 
the issues of survival, growth and profitability of this type of new firms, overlooking the 
innovation dimension. Our analysis of networking strategies of spin-offs confirms that the 
consequences of the choice of alliances partner for a spin-off’s innovation performance differ 
importantly depending on its background (i.e. corporate as opposed to university or public 
research).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we develop a 
small set of hypotheses that guide our research on the different effects of alliances of spin-
offs with either large or small and medium sized partners and the expected different outcomes 
of alliances for CSOs and PROs. This is followed by a section in which we picture the 
industrial setting for our empirical research and outline our data, sample, and measures. Next, 
we present some descriptive statistics and we test our hypotheses and some additional related 
research questions by means of instrumental-variables Poisson models, a supplementary 
analysis, and some robustness checks. In the final section, we discuss our findings in light of 
the alliance and spin-off literatures and we outline some of the limitations of our research and 
possible topics for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The vast literature on alliances appears unanimous in emphasising the importance of alliances 
for a range of firms that operate in high-tech industries (Ahuja, 2000; Carayannis et al. 2000; 
Lavie, 2007; Rothaermel et al. 2004; Soh 2003). The biopharmaceutical industry is a prime 
example of a high-tech industry where in particular new firms, such as spin-offs, play an 
                                                 
1
 A partial exception is Löfsten and Lindelöf (2005) which does not distinguish between 
different types of partners. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the latter study. 
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important role in inter-firm networks based on alliances (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006; 
Ernst & Young 2011). The continuing appeal of alliances in these industries may be 
understood from a number of perspectives, including achieving improved economies of scale 
and scope (Gomes-Casseres 1997), further specialization in newly discovered technology 
fields (Zidorn and Wagner 2012), obtaining external legitimation (Baum and Oliver 1991) 
and gaining access to tangible and intangible (complementarity) assets (Rothaermel 2001; 
Lerner and Merges 1998).  
 A more specific explanation resides in the observation that spin-offs that operate in 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries face an environment characterized by strong 
technology and market uncertainties (Santoro and McGill 2005; Senker and Sharp 1997), 
where many new chemical entities and proteins/peptides are developed but few are actually 
chosen. Recent data put the clinical success rate of pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals 
at 13 and 32 percent, respectively (DiMasi et al. 2010, see also Bienz-Tadmor et al. 1992, for 
earlier data). Even so, only about 30 percent of the products that reach the marketplace 
eventually generate enough revenues to repay their R&D costs (DiMasi and Grabowski 
2012). Given this uncertain future, the formation of alliances may be seen as an important 
way for spin-offs and other new technology-based firms to hedge their R&D investments 
(Mowery 1989; Hagedoorn 1993). 
 In addition, few, if any, spin-offs initially possess the broad range of technological 
capabilities needed to stay innovative across a broad set of products and services (Forrest 
1990). Insofar as innovations are the lifeblood of high-tech industries, allowing firms to grow 
and increase market share and, ultimately, profits (Cooper 2001), it is not surprising that the 
lack of information on new technologies is regarded as one of the most critical internal 
obstacles to innovation (Galia and Legros 2004; de Leeuw et al. 2013). New firms such as 
spin-offs are therefore often prompted into inter-firm alliances by the need to gain access to 
  
 
 
7 
other firms’ knowledge-based resources (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Scholten, Omta, Kemp, 
and Elfring, 2015). With the growth in the number of alliances, the locus of innovation for 
firms, including spin-offs, is no longer located within a single firm but rather in the network 
of alliances in which that firm is located (Freeman 1991; Powell et al. 1996). A number of 
studies demonstrate that the participation of young, startup firms in alliances is indeed 
positively associated with a range of innovation indicators (Baum et al., 2000; Chen and Li 
1999; Dowling and Helm 2006; Freel and Harrison 2006; Haeussler et al., 2012; George et 
al., 2002; Neyens et al. 2010; Shan et al. 1994; Stuart, 2000). 
 While in general we expect spin-offs, as a distinct type of a young, startup firm, to 
benefit in terms of increased innovation from their alliances with other firms, they might 
benefit differently, depending on whether they form alliances with rather dissimilar partners, 
i.e. with either large, well established, firms or with other small and medium sized firms 
(SMEs). In the literature, we see two opposed and well-supported views on the benefits for 
spin-offs and other small firms in forming alliances either with large firms or with SMEs.  
 One body of literature suggests that forming alliances with large incumbent firms 
fortify spin-offs’ reputation in terms of the perceived quality of their technology. In addition, 
research also suggests that, compared to less prominent or small partners, there is higher 
willingness of large, incumbent partners to invest in alliances (Baum et al. 2000; Stuart 2000; 
Dacin et al. 2007; Rao et al. 2008; Walter et al. 2006). Most importantly, the endorsement of 
a technology’s intrinsic value by large established firms has the potential of attracting other 
high-quality partners, which, in turn, can increase the access of a new technology-based firm, 
such as a spin-off, to critical resources and, in so doing, positively influence its innovation 
performance (Dacin et al. 2007). Stuart (2000) in his study on new technology-based firms in 
the semiconductor industry, reports that alliances with well-known and larger firms play a 
significant role in building confidence in the value of young and small firms’ product and 
  
 
 
8 
services, thereby facilitating their endeavors to attract other corporate partners and, 
ultimately, innovate. In another example, Baum et al. (2000) show that dedicated 
biotechnology firms, such as biotech spin-offs, that form alliances with prominent 
pharmaceutical firms displayed better rates of patenting activity than those forming alliances 
with other small biotech firms. In line with the latter study, Haeussler et al (2012) found that 
the alliances of new biotech firms with other new small firms offer few if any opportunities 
for new product development, although the effect of these alliances on innovation 
performance is somewhat mitigated by the degree to which the new firm has specialized 
technological capabilities. In sum, this particular perspective on alliances between small 
firms, such as spin-offs, and either large firms or SMEs suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1a. In terms of their innovation performance, spin-off firms benefit more from alliances 
with large firms than from alliances with small and medium-sized firms. 
 Interestingly, there is also an opposing view that highlights risks that small firms, 
such as spin-offs, face in partnering with large firms and that describes these alliances in 
terms of metaphors such as ‘dancing with elephants’ (Perez et al. 2012), ‘dancing with 
gorillas’ (Prashantham and Birkinshaw 2008) and ‘swimming with sharks’ (Katila, et al. 
2008). Alvarez and Barney (2001) estimate that the probability that a small firm - large firm 
alliance will be unsuccessful may be even as high as 80 percent, with many of the small firms 
involved having to declare bankruptcy following the alliance failure. Rosenbusch et al. 
(2010), who conducted a meta-analysis to review 42 empirical studies, suggest that the 
internal innovation development projects of small firms are more productive than those 
projects that involve alliances with larger firms. Similarly, a longitudinal study of alliances in 
the U.S. motion picture industry carried out by Vandaie and Zaheer (2014) indicates that 
large partners diminish the positive effect of internal capability on the growth of small, 
independent studios. 
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 The literature suggests a range of explanations as to why alliances with large 
established partners do not always meet the expectations of new technology based firms such 
as spin-offs. Some studies state that convergence of purpose stemming from cultural distance 
and technological uncertainty stand in the way of successful asymmetric alliances between 
firms of very different size (Doz 1988; Tripsas et al. 1995). Others cite the poor 
communication between two very different ‘species’: whereas larger firms feature multiple 
‘layers’ in their organizational structure and explicit processes for every task, small and 
newly established firms comprise generalists who generally use informal processes for 
getting things done (Botkin and Matthews 1992; Kelly et al. 2000; Prashantham and 
Birkinshaw 2008).  
 In general, the understanding of asymmetric alliances boils down to the basic idea that 
large firms might often leverage their bargaining power and extract a disproportional share of 
the benefits (Khanna et al. 1998; Bessy and Brousseau 1998; Kishida 2002; Lavie 2007). 
Nowhere is this more evident than in exploratory alliances, motivated by the desire to 
discover new opportunities (Koza and Lewin 1998), where firms face constant value 
allocation renegotiations about intellectual property rights and innovation benefits of newly 
discovered technologies that were impossible to foresee at the outset (Rothaermel and Deeds 
2004; Yang et al. 2014). In that context, new firms, such as spin-offs, that often lack the 
experience associated with managing alliances, are disadvantaged vis-à-vis their large 
alliance partners (Rosenbusch et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2014). Obviously, these disadvantages 
are less decisive in alliances of spin-offs with SMEs where both partners face a more similar 
level playing field. As such this rather different perspective suggests the following alternative 
hypothesis:   
H1b. In terms of their innovation performance, spin-off firms benefit more from alliances 
with small and medium-sized firms than from alliances with large firms.  
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 So far, we discussed spin-offs and the innovation performance implications of their 
alliances in terms of different alliance partner’s size categories. However, the literature on 
spin-offs suggests there are also some major differences between CSOs and PROs, as CSOs 
seem to economically outperform PROs (Stankiewicz 1994; Lindholm-Dahlstrand 1997; 
Callan 2001; Tübke 2005; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Mustar et al. 2008; Yagüe-Perales and 
March-Chordà 2012; Zhang 2009; Wennberg et al. 2011). This advantage of CSOs over 
PROs begs the question as to what factors cause these advantages and to what extent they 
impact the innovation performance of the alliances in which these different categories of 
spin-offs engage. From a general perspective, the answer to this question can be related to the 
imprinting argument set forward by Stinchcombe (1965): organizations carry the legacy of 
their founding conditions. In the context of spin-offs, the argument is as follows: CSOs 
outperform non-CSOs, such as PROs, because their founding team members exhibit different 
‘genetic’ characteristics in the form of prior business experience (Dahl and Reichestein 2007; 
Zahra et al. 2007; Andersson and Klepper 2013). In other words, spin-offs do not start their 
existence with clean slates; instead, they inherit the congenital knowledge of their 
entrepreneurial founders (Boeker 1989; Unger et al. 2011). PROs are less successful, with 
fewer prospects for growth and survival than CSOs, because their founders often lack the 
social capital required to secure external financing (Hirai et al. 2013; Shane and Stuart 2002) 
as well as the business acumen necessary to bring new products to markets (Lindholm-
Dalhstrand 1997b). According to Colombo and Piva (2012) founders of PROs seldom held 
previous managerial positions in other firms. These authors also find that academic founders 
that lack managerial experience are less likely than their peers from other spin-offs to make 
adequate commercial investments. In addition, Geenhuizen and Soetanto (2009) reveal that 
another important obstacle to growth facing PROs, such as academic spin-offs, is their lack of 
marketing knowledge.  
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 Agarwal et al. (2004) underscore the crucial role played by parental knowledge in 
linking the greater success of CSOs, compared to PROs, to better initial technological and 
market pioneering capabilities of their founders. Extending the imprinting argument, Zahra et 
al. (2007) suggest that the superior performance of CSOs, compared to that of PROs, is also 
related to their founders’ abilities to maintain and continue using a range of business 
relationships. Not only the connections and networks of alliances that the founders of a CSOs 
inherit at inception of new ventures significantly enhance the ability of CSOs to transform 
knowledge into valuable products. Recent entrepreneurship research found that the ability of 
effective strategy formulation will vary by founder’s identity and prior experience (Fauchart 
and Gruber 2011; Casper and Storz 2015). Careful identification of the ‘right’ alliance 
partners is not a trivial task and is considered as one of the keys for successful alliance 
strategy by new ventures (Greve, Rowley, Shipilov 2014; Walter et al. 2006). Given these 
findings, we expect that the corporate or academic backgrounds of the founders of CSOs or 
PROs have an enduring impact on the strategic choices of new firms such as the choice of 
particular alliance partners. 
In sum, given that the CSO founders’ contacts and previous networks are more varied, 
business-related, and valuable compared to those of PROs, compounded with superior 
technological, market pioneering as well as network strategy-formulation capabilities of 
CSOs, we expect that, compared to PROs, CSOs are better able to benefit from their inter-
firm alliances. Hence: 
H2. In terms of their innovation performance, corporate spin-offs benefit more from 
alliances with other firms than public research spin-offs. 
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METHODS 
Industry setting 
The industry setting for our study is found in the field of combinatorial chemistry, for which 
the period that we study in the context of alliance formation (1990-2003) marks the crucial 
shift from its very early emerging state to a first stage of some maturity (Thomke and 
Kuemmerle 2002). It is important to note that over time, the term ‘combinatorial chemistry’ 
has taken different meanings, leading to some degree of misunderstanding and even 
confusion (Lebl 2002). For some, it refers solely to the split-mix method, arguably the first 
combinatorial synthesis technology developed by Arkad Furka at Eötvös University in 
Budapest in 1982. For others, including the International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (IUPAC), the term denotes any process used “ … to prepare large sets of organic 
compounds by combining sets of building blocks …” (Maclean et al., 1999: 2351). This 
broader definition encompasses more than a dozen techniques, ranging from parallel 
synthesis to click chemistry, and it reflects the industry and technology setting that is subject 
to our study.  
 Virtually all process innovations related to combinatorial chemistry originated in 
academic laboratories and other PROs, including the Central Veterinary Institute in the 
Netherlands (parallel synthesis), University of Cambridge (diversity-oriented synthesis), 
Torrey Pines Institute for Molecular Studies (the ‘tea-bag’ procedure), the German National 
Research Center for Biotechnology (SPOT synthesis), and Scripps Research Institute (click 
chemistry). Over time, university researchers, professors, and other public sector researchers 
coming from the chemistry discipline jumped on the combinatorial bandwagon, launching 
spin-offs in the United States (e.g. Richard Houghton at the Torrey Pines Institute for 
Molecular Studies formed Houghton Pharmaceuticals), Great Britain (e.g. Steve Davies from 
Oxford University launched Oxford Asymmetry), France (e.g. Thierry Jean resigned from the 
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CNRS to establish Cerep) and Denmark (e.g. Glenn Tong from the Technical University of 
Denmark co-founded AudA Pharmaceuticals).  
 However, the industry is not exclusively populated by PROs. Established in 1988, 
Affymax and Coselco Mimotopes were the first two new technology-based firms set up to 
engage in combinatorial chemistry research. Palo-Alto based independent start-up Affymax 
was the brainchild of Alejandro Zaffaroni – the quintessential Schumpeterian entrepreneur, 
legendary for having launched several successful firms (notably Syntex, Alza, and DNAX). 
Coselco Mimotope was established as a CSO from Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, 
Australia’s largest biotech firm. This later case was not unique. Many other firms have also 
spun off start-ups with a competence in combinatorial chemistry: e.g. GlaxoSmithKline spun 
out NiKem Research; Hoffman LaRoche, Basilea Pharmaceuticals; Scios, Guilford 
Pharmaceuticals; Affymax, Affymetrix and Maxygen. In addition, manufacturers of scientific 
instrumentation (e.g. Advanced ChemTech), computational chemistry suppliers (e.g. Tripos) 
and, most commonly, biotechnology firms (e.g. Oxford Glycosciences, Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals) that were seeking to diversify their technology portfolios, also entered into 
this field.  
Data and sample  
We test our hypotheses on a longitudinal data set composed of 135 spin-offs operating in the 
combinatorial chemistry industry. Technology class information was used to make an initial 
identification of spin-offs with a clear competence in combinatorial chemistry. Each firm had 
to be endowed with at least one ‘Class 506’ patent (which is a special subclass created by the 
USPTO for inventions in the domain of combinatorial chemistry technology) or have a 
  
 
 
14 
scientific publication in that field
 2
. We then applied the following three criteria to the initial 
selection: the firm had to be 1) publicly traded so as to allow the collection of R&D 
expenditures data, 2) established as either a PRO or a CSO, and 3) commercially active 
between 1990 and 2003. Following Thomke and Kuemmerle (2002), this timeframe 
represents a particularly interesting period to examine as it largely captures the rapid 
emergence of combinatorial chemistry and its most dynamic phase of industrial technological 
development.  
 Reviewing the spin-off literature, we found no unifying consensus of a practical 
definition of either PROs or CSOs (Iacobucci et al 2011). In order to remove the ambiguity 
involved with identifying different types of spin-offs, we adopted the OECD definition of 
PRO. Accordingly, the term is defined as any new firm 1) of which the key technology is 
licensed from a university or another PRO, 2) which includes a university or public sector 
employee as a founder, and/or 3) in which a PRO has made an equity investment (Callan 
2001). A CSO, by contrast, refers to any independent entity founded on the basis of a 
technology and human capital originating from a parent firm (Lindholm-Dalhstrand1997b). 
Guided by these considerations, we were able to identify 98 public research-based spin-offs 
(PROs) and 37 corporate spin-offs (CSOs) among our sample firms. Some 104 firms are 
located in the United States, while the remaining firms are established in eleven EU 
countries, primarily in Sweden, Great Britain, and Germany, as well as in Canada. 
 We collected data from a variety of sources. Alliance records were compiled from the 
Recombinant Capital, a health care data company, owned by Deloitte Consulting and from 
the websites of the sample spin-offs. In the present study, we consider all alliances that were 
established between 1990 and 2003 and which include licensing agreements, R&D contracts, 
                                                 
2. For an examination of the process of creating a new patent category for combinatorial 
chemistry within the International Patent Classification (IPC), see Kang (2012). 
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R&D pacts, minority holdings, distribution or manufacturing agreements, asset trading, joint 
ventures, and consortia. From the two data sources we were able to identify some 3048 
alliances undertaken by the sample firms in the period during which we calculate (lagged) 
alliance measures using a 3-year window. Alliances are differentiated into those between 
spin-offs and large firms (1284 alliances in total), those between spin-offs and SMEs (1184 
alliances in total), alliances between spin-offs and PROs (524 in total) and alliances between 
spin-offs and their parent firms (56 in total). We retrieved information on patents, to construct 
our measure of innovation performance, from the Technology Profile Report maintained by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our measure is based on granted patents, an 
indication of successful patent applications that we subsequently assigned to a particular 
application year. Data on firm-level variables, such as R&D expenditures and the number of 
employees of US firms were obtained from SEC data at sec.gov., similar data for non-US 
firms were obtained from annual reports and firm websites.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. We use an invention (patent) count as our measure of spin-off’s 
innovation output. Insofar as firms were engaged in a broad spectrum of research activities, 
patent data not only include patents in ‘Class 506’, but also those related to technologies 
other than combinatorial chemistry, as for example ‘Class 435’ (molecular biology and 
microbiology). Patents are typically regarded as among the most effective source of 
information for research on innovation and have been widely used as an indication of firm 
innovation (Sampson, 2007).  One of their key advantages is reliability and objectivity 
because new inventions are cross-examined whether they satisfy criteria of novelty by patent 
officers at the U.S. Department of Commerce. The caveats of using patent data as a proxy for 
innovativeness are well known: not all innovations are patented, and those that are do display 
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a great deal of variability in terms of value or importance (Pavitt 1985; Griliches 1990). The 
dependent variable is measured in year t+1 with respect to the right-hand-side variables.  
Focal independent variables. Alliances are measured as the number of alliances established 
by the firm in the years t-2 through t as constituting its alliance portfolio (i.e. cumulative sum 
over three years prior to the measurement of the dependent variable). Alliance data precede 
patent data for two reasons. First, learning from alliance partners is not automatic; it requires 
commitment, resources and, not least, time (Bierly and Chakrabarty 1996). Second, a 
gestation lag naturally separates the start of an alliance and the output of innovative activity 
(Stuart 2000). For the purpose of this study, a large firm alliance is defined as an alliance 
with a partner firm of more than 500 employees (more than twice the average size of a spin-
off) whereas a SME partner has fewer than 500 employees.  
Control variables. We control for alliances that spin-off firms formed with PROs and with 
their own parent firms. These two variables are constructed in the similar way as the focal 
variables. Research shows that alliances between industry and universities intensified in the 
1990’s (e.g. Hall et al., 2003). Public science is attractive for firms because it provides low 
cost access to new knowledge and recent scientific developments. Alliances with parent firms 
may serve the purpose of strengthening a newly established firm’s reputation and the 
perceived quality of its technology and provide a newly establish venture with resources.  
 The R&D expenditures (measured in log of US dollar value) variable accounts for 
variation in inputs into the innovation process (Griliches, 1990). R&D activities are expected 
to be a vital instrument in the innovation process and these activities are also expected to 
eventually be transformed into patents, certainly in a high-tech and patent-driven sector such 
combinatorial chemistry. In addition, higher levels of internal R&D activities of firms can 
also be seen as a signal of valuable R&D capabilities to potential alliance partners. 
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 Firm size (the logarithm of the number of firm employees) is a standard control 
variable in innovation studies and refers to the classical Schumpeterian understanding of the 
impact of firm size, through economies of scale and scope, on innovative performance in 
general and patenting activity, in particular (see also Belderbos, et al., 2006).  
 We also control for the technological diversification of spin-offs that can affect both 
innovation output and alliance activities of firms due their technological flexibility (Bierly 
and Chakrabarty, 1996). Technological diversification refers to the distribution of patents in a 
firm’s patent portfolio over technology classes. Technology class information comes from the 
patent classes into which patents are assigned. To construct the diversification measure we 
distinguished between 243 unique 3-digit patent classes. We use a standard Shannon-Wiener 
diversity index to measure technological diversification, i.e. 𝑇𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖 log 1 𝑝𝑖⁄𝑖  where 𝑖 
stands for any patent class. Obviously, a firm that has been granted patents in different patent 
classes will have a greater diversification index than a firm with patents in a single patent 
class. In addition, all models include unreported year dummies.  
 
RESULTS 
Some descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in table 1. We have predominantly 
small firms in our sample of spin-offs with a mean of about 180 employees. Average alliance 
portfolio size is about seven alliances, based on a 3-year cumulative sum, including alliances 
with PROs and parent firms. The latter two types are not very frequent in our data, with 
sample average of 1.07 and 0.16, respectively. Pairwise correlations among the variables used 
in the estimation are moderate in most cases, with two exceptions. This includes the 
correlation between firm size and R&D and between alliances with large firms and SMEs. 
We show that any estimated effect of these two alliance variables is not due to potential 
(spurious) correlation, by also estimating models with only one of these variables included. 
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The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for the variables used in our models is about 2.6, 
which is below the commonly used threshold of 10 (Cohen et al. 2003). 
----------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------ 
 From the early until late 1990s we observe among the sample firms a strong upward 
trend in the alliance formation that flattens in 1998-1999 (see figure 1). This in turn is 
followed by a strong recovery around the turn of the century and a further dip after the 
technology crisis. The upward trend is more pronounced among the PROs than CSOs (see 
figure 2). Overall, these trends are consistent with those documented in Roijakkers and 
Hagedoorn (2006) and Schilling (2009).   
 The composition of these alliances is largely similar in the two types of spin-offs, 
suggesting that variation of innovation performance across spin-offs cannot be linked, for 
instance, to variation in the number of R&D contracts (see figures 3a and b). 
---------------- Insert Figures 1, 2, 3a and b about here --------------- 
 In the estimation of our models we seek to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity of the focal variables. Regarding the former, we argue that a core part 
of unobserved firm heterogeneity will be fixed, given the relatively short time span of our 
analysis. A number of firm traits, such as their CSO or PRO nature, founding team’s 
demographic traits, and the nature of human capital will not change or change little over time. 
In our empirical models we control for such influences by including firm fixed effects.  
 A second potential source of endogeneity is the formation of alliances (over time). 
Alliance formation may be not be completely exogenous if this is driven by other endogenous 
concerns such as the search for technological variety or if alliance formation is dictated by 
the relative ease or difficulty of attracting alliance partners. The latter may play a role if the 
more successful firms in terms of their patenting become systematically more attractive as 
alliance partners.  
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 We sought to address the above concerns by conducting estimation of our model via 
instrumental variables (IV) and fixed-effects Poisson regression methods.
3
 In the IV GMM 
approach, we instrument alliances with other firms, alliances with large firms and SMEs, with 
their lagged values (measured in period t-3 to t-5) and a dummy variable indicating whether 
the firm is vested in the US or in the EU. 
 We present this analysis of the relationship between alliances and the innovation 
performance of spin-offs
4
 in table 1 and the non-instrumented versions of our fixed-effects 
count models in the Appendix. The GMM specification and the non-IV models produce 
consistent results while the Hansen test does not reject appropriateness of the instruments. 
 Regarding the control variables, we find, not surprisingly, that R&D expenditures 
have the expected positive and significant effect on the innovation performance of spin-offs 
in this industry. The effect of the technological diversification of these spin-offs is significant 
in model I and model III. 
 Model I confirms our baseline understanding of a positive association of the number 
of inter-firm alliances of spin-offs and their innovation performance. In support of hypothesis 
1a, we find that alliances of spin-offs with large firms have a positive impact on their 
innovation performance and, in rejection of the alternative hypothesis 1b, alliances with small 
firms have an insignificant impact on their innovative performance (see table 2, Model II). 
The difference between the two estimated coefficients is statistically significant (𝜒2 (1) = 
                                                 
3. Estimation of our models with the fixed-effects Poisson regression method implies that we 
cannot include any time-invariant variables, such as a dummy for the background of the firm 
or personal characteristics of the founder(s), in our models, since such a dummy always takes 
the same value during the estimation period. In the random effects specification of the 
Poisson model (not reported) we were able to estimate the coefficient of the dummy for the 
background of the firm, but we found that it is not statistically significant, implying that a 
spin-off’s background does not directly determine our sample firm’s innovation performance.  
5. From the original sample of 135 firms, nine firms report zero patents during the estimation 
period and one firm has only one observation and hence these firms are dropped from the 
Poisson fixed-effects regression. Four of these firms are CSOs and six are PROs.  
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4.34, p-value=0.03). In support of hypothesis 2, in terms of their innovation performance, 
CSOs benefit more from alliances with other firms than PROs (see Table 2, Model III).  The 
difference between the two estimated coefficients is again statistically significant (𝜒2 (1) = 
12.84, p-value=0.00). 
 
Supplementary analysis 
In addition to testing the hypotheses and in further consideration of the role of alliance 
partners of different firm sizes, we also explored whether spin-offs, in terms of either CSOs 
or PROs, benefit more from having alliances with large firms or with SMEs (see table 2, 
model IV). In line with some previous studies (Baum et al. 2000; Stuart 2000), we find that 
both CSOs and PROs improve their innovation performance if they cooperate with large 
firms. The difference between the two estimated coefficients is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, our findings also suggest that, in particular for PROs, alliances with SMEs have 
a negative impact on their innovation performance (see table 2, model IV).  
 The logic behind hypothesis 2 would suggest that, contrary to CSOs, PROs may 
actually benefit more from alliances with other PROs with which they share a common 
background. We explored this by estimating an additional regression (not reported) in which 
we interacted PRO alliances with the spin-off dummy. The PRO alliances of PROs are indeed 
positive and significant in a random effects Poisson model (and marginally insignificant in 
the fixed effects model), while the effect for CSOs is negative and marginally significant.  
Robustness checks 
To test the robustness of our findings we estimated a number of alternative specifications of 
our model. We explored the models with an alternative alliance variable, that is, calculated 
using a 5-year window, to examine a potential influence of longer lags on firm’s patent 
output. These results are largely in line with those obtained from the reported models using a 
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3-year window. One notable exception is the coefficient on alliances by PROs, which 
becomes marginally significant. However, in line with hypothesis 2, the coefficient on this 
variable is statistically significantly smaller than that for the CSOs. This may suggest that the 
positive innovation performance effects of inter-firm alliances are slower to gestate among 
PROs than among CSOs. 
 To test whether the underlying main effects of alliance variables are non-linear, we 
considered models with the square terms of the three alliances variables included. However, 
none of these square terms are statistically significant. Inclusion of the square terms also 
makes the linear terms insignificant, hence we can rule out non-linearity.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the combinatorial chemistry industry emerged and reached its phase of early maturity, 
spin-offs in this field were bracing for serious challenges presented by a globalizing 
environment that is characterized by a fast pace of technological change (Malo and Geuna 
2000). In order to survive in this environment, these firms needed to initiate shrewd alliance 
strategies (Mohr et al. 2014). Interestingly, it seems that this is exactly what spin-offs in the 
field of combinatorial chemistry did during the period 1990 – 2003. Specifically, as also 
demonstrated through Figures 1 and 2 show, their level of engagement in alliance activity 
steadily increased during the larger part of that early period. As reported in the above, this 
increase in alliance formation in the early period of the combinatorial chemistry industry is in 
line with the general alliance formation trend across a wider range of industries.  
In the context of that general trend, there is an established literature on the innovation 
performance effects of alliances in high-tech industries, and in biotechnology industry in 
particular (e.g., Baum et al. 2000; Kim 2012; Rothaermel et al. 2004; Stuart 2000; Soh 2003; 
Sorrentino and Garrafo 2010).  In this paper, we contribute to this literature by examining the 
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relative effectiveness of alliance strategies for spin-offs – a specific type of young, 
technology-based firms – in affecting their innovation performance. We developed 
hypotheses that aimed to examine how the innovation performance of spin-off firms can 
benefit from inter-firm alliances with different categories of firms such as large firms or small 
and medium sized partners, a topic on which extant literature is still rather contradictory. We 
also contribute to the entrepreneurship literature on spin-offs by examining the innovation 
performance effects of alliances for both CSOs and PROs as two major categories of spin-
offs with disparate corporate and public research backgrounds that we expect to benefit 
differently from their inter-firm alliances.  
Key Findings 
Our analysis clearly demonstrates that spin-off firms operating in a nascent industry can 
benefit from increasing numbers of alliances that positively affect their innovation 
performance. Given the relatively small number of alliances in which these spin-offs engage 
(see the descriptive statistics), the effect of decreasing returns to larger alliance portfolios and 
the effect of the relational mix of larger alliance portfolios (Wassmer, 2010) seems to be not 
that relevant in the current context. In addition to such a general finding, our study suggests a 
number of more specific novel insights related to the preference of spin-offs for particular 
partners and their corporate or public research background. First, during this early period of 
the combinatorial chemistry industry, inter-firm alliances with specific partners, in terms of 
their firm size, benefitted spin-offs in different ways. While alliances with relatively large 
partners generated benefits in terms of increased innovation performance, those with SME 
partners did not. In line with previous research, this finding suggests that spin-offs can benefit 
from alliances with large firms that bring superior alliance management capabilities to joint 
projects (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). These alliances with large firms also increase spin-
  
 
 
23 
offs’ status and reputation that make it easier for these firms to attract other capable partners 
(Baum et al. 2000; Stuart 2000; Dacin et al. 2007; Rao et al. 2008).  
Second, when looking at the background of spin-offs we see that during the 
emergence and early growth of the combinatorial chemistry industry, CSOs benefitted more 
from their inter-firm alliances than PROs. While both types of firms, CSOs and PROs, stand 
to gain from alliances with larger firms, PROs seemed to lose when they ally with SMEs, 
while such effect was neutral for CSOs. The greater benefits from inter-firm alliances for 
CSOs, compared to PROs, can be interpreted in light of the corporate or public research 
backgrounds imprinted in these spin-offs.  
Implications  
Our study contributes to spin-off and alliance research by highlighting how crafty selection of 
appropriate alliance partners, depending on the focal firm’s background can foster spin-off’s 
innovation. Specifically, our findings suggest that alliances do not have a unitary effect on 
innovation, and that spin-off firms are able to learn from their large partners and improve 
their innovation performance, despite the appropriation dangers that such asymmetric 
alliances potentially hold. On the other hand, spin-offs find fewer learning opportunities 
through alliances with SMEs. These smaller partners have somewhat comparable capabilities 
and hence are less likely to offer opportunities for advanced technology and product 
development similar to those offered by larger partners.  
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in general by highlighting the 
importance of the venture’s background. Previous studies on entrepreneurship indicate that 
the founding team’s origins affect firm success (e.g., Cooper 1971; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1990; Mangematin et al. 2003). One conclusion from prior studies is that in the 
context of PROs versus CSOs there is evidence that CSOs outperformed PROs in terms of 
return on assets and productivity, in large part because CSOs’ founders had an advantage in 
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using their prior experience, networks and connections (e.g., Benghozi and Salvador, 2014; 
Zahra et al. 2007). Our study demonstrates that similar advantages, in terms of prior 
experience, networks and connections, play a role in creating greater innovation performance 
benefits from a broad range of inter-firm alliances for CSOs compared to PROs. During the 
nascent state of the combinatorial chemistry industry the founding team members of CSOs 
were still connected to their corporate origins while PROs lacked these advantages and had 
fewer options but to search for alliances with more visible larger corporate partners. 
Limitations and future research  
Our study has a number of limitations, which at the same time suggest avenues for future 
research. First, our sample of a single industry could limit the generalizability of our findings. 
The role of different types of alliances for young, innovative spin-offs in different industrial 
settings is worth further investigation in light of renewed academic and policy interest for 
such firms (see Schneider and Veugelers, 2010).  
 Second, our empirical setting largely covers the emergence and gradual maturing of 
the combinatorial chemistry industry, a period characterized by high growth and high alliance 
activity of spin-offs. Further research could determine whether alliances continue to play a 
significant (positive) role as an industry further matures.  
 Third, as is the case with most innovation studies, we cannot fully exclude the 
possibility of reverse causality. Interestingly, a number of studies have examined a reverse 
relationship, i.e. the impact of firm’s innovation on its alliance formation. For example, 
Ahuja (2000) concludes that innovativeness has a significant positive effect on alliance 
formation in the chemicals industry. Stuart (2000) and Podolny, Stuart and Hannman (1996) 
report similar findings in the semiconductor industry. The logic behind this relationship, 
using Ahuja’s (2000) terminology, is that a firm’s propensity to form alliances is determined 
by both ‘inducements’ and ‘opportunities’. Innovative firms may have greater ‘opportunities’ 
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to engage in alliances, because these firms are more attractive partners for joint technology 
development.  On the other hand, high levels of technical and commercial expertise will 
reduce firms’ ‘inducement’ to engage in alliances. As firms engage in alliances, successful 
innovative firms face a danger of involuntary dissipation of their knowledge to potential 
competitors, which can lead to weakening of their competitive advantage. Our research 
suggests that for resource inhibited spin-offs it is primarily positive ‘inducements’ that play 
an important role, thus mitigating the reverse causality logic. In addition, in an attempt to 
further minimize this possibility in the current analysis, we estimated our models with the 
instrumental-variables method.  
 Fourth, our analysis took into account the technological diversity of the firms in a 
broad sense, ignoring possible technological relatedness between dyads in a focal firm’s 
alliances (Sampson, 2007). Further insights into an optimal alliance portfolio will require 
taking into account additional characteristics of alliance partners such as their knowledge 
base and the intensity of the collaboration. The interplay between the characteristics of the 
firm, such as its exploration or exploitation orientation, the characteristics of its alliance 
partners, the strategic fit of partners, and the impact of host countries could refine the model. 
Our analysis is largely macroscopic and could neither include potential organizational 
moderators nor assess the effect of the composition of the founding team on the effects of 
alliances on innovation performance. In our analysis, we attempt to mitigate this via fixed 
effects to control for team and firm-related time invariant unobservable characteristics and we 
encourage future research to further explore the micro-foundations of spin-offs’ networking 
strategies. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations   
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Patents 6.96 15.48 1.00       
2. Firm size (log) 4.63 1.14 0.38 1.00      
3. R&D expenditures 9.44 1.50 0.39 0.66 1.00     
4. Technological diversification 0.58 0.58 0.32 0.41 0.42 1.00    
5. Alliances with own parent firm 0.16 0.48 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 1.00   
6. Alliances with PROs 1.07 1.69 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.23 1.00  
7. Alliances with large firms 3.07 3.49 0.27 0.47 0.39 0.34 -0.01 0.14 1.00 
8. Alliances with SMEs 2.87 3.66 0.32 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.01 0.17 0.65 
 
Note. Correlations based on 929 observations for 125 firms. Correlations greater than .07 are statistically significant at an alpha level of .05, and correlations greater than 
|.05| are statistically significant at an alpha level of .01. 
 
  
Table 2 Alliances and the innovation performance of corporate and public research spin-offs 
 
 Variable       Model I   Model II    Model III    Model IV 
Constant -4.195*** -5.625*** -4.241*** -5.406*** 
 (0.504)    (1.184)    (0.522)    (0.972)    
Firm size -0.031    -0.231     0.009     0.026    
             (0.119)    (0.402)    (0.107)    (0.137)    
R&D   0.504***  0.761***  0.489***  0.620*** 
             (0.060)    (0.210)    (0.049)    (0.081)    
Technological diversification  0.446*** -0.217     0.565***  0.127    
             (0.081)    (0.482)    (0.085)    (0.286)    
Alliances with own parent firm  -0.031     0.161     0.020     0.165    
             (0.107)    (0.162)    (0.084)    (0.119)    
Alliances with PROs -0.073**  -0.105    -0.098*** -0.118*** 
(0.035)    (0.070)    (0.031)    (0.037)    
Alliances with other firms  0.059***                               
             (0.019)                                  
Alliances with large firms            0.258**                      
                       (0.110)                        
Alliances with  SMEs           -0.071                        
          (0.074)                        
Alliances of CSOs with other firms                      0.059***           
                                 (0.016)              
Alliances of PROs with other firms                      0.025              
                                 (0.020)              
Alliances of CSOs with large firms                                          0.093*** 
                              (0.034)    
Alliances of PROs with large firms                                         0.187*** 
                              (0.062)    
Alliances of CSOs with SMEs                                0.048    
                              (0.044)    
Alliances of PROs with SMEs                               -0.153**  
                              (0.078)    
Hansen test, p(value)  2.248 (0.13)    1.451 (0.48)  2.481 (0.29)    1.490 ( 0.47) 
Note: Results from fixed effects instrumental-variables Poisson models. Robust (clustered) standard errors in 
parentheses.  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models are estimated on a sample of 929 observations for 125 
firms and include 8 time dummies. The dependent variable is measured in year t+1 with respect to the right-
hand-side variables. The Hansen test statistic is the test of overidentifying restrictions. 
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Figure 1 Spin-off alliance formation with large and small & medium-sized firms by year 
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Figure 2 Spin-offs alliance formation by year and type of spin-off firm 
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Figure 3a Distribution of R&D alliances, licensing agreements, and other types of alliances 
for CSOs 
 
 
 
Figure 3b Distribution of R&D alliances, licensing agreements, and other types of alliances 
for PROs  
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APPENDIX 
Alliances and the innovation performance, fixed-effects Poisson without instrumental 
variables 
 
 Variable       Model I   Model II    Model III    Model IV 
Firm size 0.101 0.033 0.097 0.025 
             (0.204) (0.167) (0.202) (0.177) 
R&D  0.225** 0.252** 0.236** 0.256** 
             (0.108) (0.109) (0.104) (0.112) 
Technological diversification 0.198 0.216* 0.210* 0.222* 
             (0.123) (0.128) (0.120) (0.127) 
Alliances with own parent firm  -0.002 0.017 0.008 0.015 
             (0.119) (0.113) (0.115) (0.112) 
Alliances with PROs -0.044 -0.026 -0.048 -0.024 
(0.041) (0.022) (0.041) (0.027) 
Alliances with other firms 0.026***    
             (0.009)    
Alliances with large firms  0.081***   
              (0.016)   
Alliances with  SMEs  -0.035**   
 (0.014)   
Alliances of CSOs with other firms   0.031***  
               (0.008)  
Alliances of PROs with other firms   0.021  
               (0.015)  
Alliances of CSOs with large firms              0.085*** 
   (0.018) 
Alliances of PROs with large firms             0.074** 
   (0.030) 
Alliances of CSOs with SMEs    -0.039 
   (0.027) 
Alliances of PROs with SMEs    -0.031* 
   (0.019) 
Log-likelihood -2665.13    -2570.98    -2663.13    -2570.42    
𝜒2 test of improved model fit  188.29*** 3.99** 185.43*** 
Note: Results from fixed effects Poisson models. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models are estimated on a sample of 929 observations for 125 firms and 
include 8 time dummies. The dependent variable is measured in year t+1 with respect to the right-hand-side 
variables. The 𝜒2  test statistic is the likelihood-ratio test comparing the focal model with the more 
parsimonious model 
 
